My question involves court procedures for the state of: Washington State
For years now I have been suffering intrusion upon seclusion and subsequent public disclosure of private facts on a very, very, broad scale. I have tried on numerous occasions and been unable to have anyone verifiable deny having knowledge and/or information of the matter. A witness I have has also made statements reflecting evident knowledge of extortion as well. As I am not a lawyer, having one speak to him will probably uncover more still. These violations are still on-going.
The witness has repeatedly said he has knowledge of how the intrusion upon seclusion and subsequent public disclosure of private facts is being effected and by whom.
So, to summarize so far, I have about 2 dozen people who have been unable or unwilling to swear a denial of ongoing torts, and a witness who says he can and will testify as to what is ongoing that everyone else evidently can't deny. And, due to the nature and facts of this case, these instances of an inability to deny things could, I assure you, be repeated well-nigh ad infinitum. And, given the "adverse inference" clause this will become a matter of civilly prosecuting common public knowledge to the standard of a preponderance of evidence.
I'll assume you all know what the Adverse Inference clause is, if you don't and would like to, I'll post/P.M. you the Supreme Court citations on request.
I have already filed an administrative claim with the federal government, which was denied last September, leaving a six month clock running (from that date) on filing a lawsuit.
The claim was specifically against the F.B.I. for "failure to act to abate infliction of harm" the liability for which is described in a learned treatise by Vincent R. Johnson titled "Mastering Torts" (2005). The harm not being prevented being, in part at least, violations of 18USC241 (which does cover privacy, since it is a right under the law, and this law covers even just privileges: http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgi...ction=retrieve ).
As to the damage amount to be sought, while the matter at hand is tortious, the simple fact remains that it does also constitute violation(s) of criminal law. As I understand it, this is pertinent in civil court as it speaks to the reprehensibility of the matter. I'm not completely sure, but I believe part of the damages are what are considered "unliquidated damages", so shouldn’t the statute then also suggest a damages amount, such as the fine set out in 18USC241 referred to above?
This has been ongoing for years (atleast 10 years this Memorial Day 2010), in three states (though I haven't resided in Indiana since about Sept. 2007, and California since October 2003).
As for the Government finding shelter in the "Public Duty Rule", a law journal article on pertinent Washington State law seem to cast substantial doubt on this, see: "THE VALUE OF GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY: WASHINGTON STATE'S JOURNEY FROM IMMUNITY TO ACCOUNTABILITY", 2006 by the Seattle University Law Review; Debra L. Stephens, Bryan P. Harnetiaux, within which we have:
"Over the years, both judges and commentators have expressed concern that the public duty doctrine operates
as a judicial restoration of sovereign immunity in defiance of the legislature's waiver. [FN137] Recently,
in response to such criticism and calls to abandon the public duty doctrine, the Washington Supreme
Court clarified the doctrine's limited purpose and scope. [FN138] In Osborn v. Mason County, the court
Because a public entity is liable in tort “to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation,”
former RCW 4.92.090 (1963) and former 4.96.010 (1967) (municipality), the public duty
doctrine does not--cannot-- provide immunity from liability. Rather it is a “focusing tool” we use to
determine whether a public entity owed a duty to a “nebulous public” or a particular individual. The
public duty doctrine simply reminds us that a public entity--like any other defendant--is liable for
negligence only if it has a statutory or common law duty of care. And its “exceptions” indicate when a
statutory or common law duty exists. “The question whether an exception to the public duty doctrine
applies is thus another way of asking whether the State has a duty to the plaintiff.” In other words, the
public duty doctrine helps us distinguish proper legal duties from mere hortatory “duties.”
I have another angle on this, and it's something I'm thinking I should file another Standard form 95 (required under the Federal Tort Claims act) for. That by refusing to act (and I went to them for help), the government "Aided, abetted and encouraged" the conduct. Remember, this has gone on daily, for years, and on a huge scale. Why don't people commonly (REALLY commonly) jump over bank counters? I believe it is common knowledge beyond dispute that it is fear of legal consequence. 10 years of being allowed to engage in this conduct has taught the public that my rights don't matter. The Gov't commonly punishes for much less egregious conduct.
What I'm saying is, whether or not they are legally required to act, they chose not to, and that was definately, according to the facts of this case, "substantial" aid or encouragement (as outlined in Dan Dobbs, Law of Torts, Section 340, page 937).
I'm planning to file suit within the 6 months to protect the original failure to act claim, but should I continue it while the aiding and abetting and encouraging claim is reviewed, or will there be no res judicata issues there? If I understand the law right, It seems I'll really need to file a new administrative claim for the aiding, abbeting & encouraging even though they denied any knowledge of the underlying issue (the Seattle F.B.I.'s counsel sent it all the way to Washington D.C. and they denied it from there. Alot of trouble to go to if there's nothing to it.). I forgot the letter, I'll post their reply tommrow. Taken at face value, it would seem to indicate no need to make another administrative claim (standard form 95), but the law seems to say...
I am doing this Pro Se at this time.