As noted by appellant, there is a split among the federal circuits as to how this statute should be interpreted. Several courts have interpreted the legislation as drawing a distinction between "misaddressed" and "misdelivered" mail, holding that where the sender places the name of a third person on the envelope but uses the defendant's address, the item ceases to be "mail matter" once it has been delivered to the place listed on the envelope, even if the addressee is not at that address.
See,
e.
g.,
United States v. Lavin, 567 F.2d 579, 581 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Anton, 547 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1976); and
United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 83, 88
-89 (5th Cir
.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 921 (1972). Under that view, although it is permissible to prosecute a defendant for stealing from a letter addressed to another location that has been misdelivered to the defendant's address, a defendant cannot be prosecuted for stealing from an envelope that contains the defendant's address, even if a third party is the named addressee. Other circuits have taken the view that a person may be prosecuted for mail theft for stealing mail addressed to another person, regardless whether it is misdelivered or misaddressed.
See,
e.
g.,
United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1988)
, cert. denied, 490U.S. 1110 (1989);
United States v. Douglas, 668 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).