Quote Quoting Equality4all
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In my eyes, things like this are a step BACKWARDS in the ways of civil rights and equality.
Under our legal system all discrimination by persons/entities other than the government is legal unless there is some law that expressly prohibits the discrimination involved. One law that prohibits some types of discrimination is the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But that Act does not bar the discrimination described here. No federal law does. And to my knowledge no state law would prohibit this particular instance of discrimination either, though it's possible that perhaps one or more states do. I can understand wanting to eliminate all instance of race discrimination but new legislation would be needed to bar what this app is doing, perhaps an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Quote Quoting pg1067
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I'm not saying it's crystal clear, and I'm not going to take the time to research it, but it wouldn't surprise me to find out that this sort of thing has yet to be litigated, and it wouldn't at all surprise me to find most courts ruling that apps are "places of public accommodation."
The problem with this particular case is that the service, as I understand it, is simply a listing of black owned businesses. It therefore doesn't meet the definition in the Act of the sorts of things that are public accommodations. In my research of the cases on this the courts look to see if the establishment, whether a brick and mortar or online, fit within one of the boxes, if you will, that the statute lays out as places of public accommodation. I don't see anywhere in that list of places that would fit a simple listing of black owned businesses. Moreover, many courts have held that virtual only businesses simply don't meet the requirement for a place of public accommodations under the Civil Rights Act (CRA):

“Whether an entity qualifies as a ‘place of public accommodation’ can be a fact-intensive inquiry, because establishments ‘differ markedly in their operations.’ ” Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nesmith v. YMCA of Raleigh, N.C., 397 F.2d 96, 98 (4th Cir. 1968)). Twitter is correct that a number of courts have concluded that companies which provide online services exclusively do not fall under the ambit of Title II's prohibition against discrimination in places of “public accommodation” as that definition is limited to businesses which operate out of physical facilities. See e.g. Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 541 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff'd, No. 03-1770, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (“[A]s the relevant case law and an examination the statute's exhaustive definition make clear, ‘places of public accommodation’ are limited to actual, physical places and structures, and thus cannot include chat rooms, which are not actual physical facilities but instead are virtual forums for communication provided by AOL to its members.”); see also Ebeid, No. 18-CV-07030-PJH, 2019 WL 2059662, at *6 (“Facebook is not a public accommodation covered by Title II.”).

Wilson v. Twitter, No. 3:20-CV-00054, 2020 WL 3410349, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. May 1, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:20-0054, 2020 WL 3256820 (S.D.W. Va. June 16, 2020). The magistrate goes on to note that under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) courts have found some virtual businesses to be places of public accommodation, but the language of the ADA is slightly different from the CRA. Might the courts evolve to extend the ADA rulings to the CRA and include virtual only businesses within the scope of public accommodation? Perhaps they will. But even if they do, they still must find that the virtual businesses fall in one of those boxes that describes a place of public accommodation.