Wrong. A lawsuit for damages for a violation of your federal Constitutional rights is a §1983 claim. The Court opinions I quoted to you earlier specifically say judges are immune from from such lawsuits. A judge is immune from suit even if the plaintiff claims the judge acted out of malice or bad faith:
Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 554, 87 S.Ct., at 1218 (“[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736–2739, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity).
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991).
As for the test for when a judge is acting in his judicial capacity, that is not based on whether the judge violated your right, as you claim. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court has set out this test:
The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a “judicial” one relate to the nature of the act itself, i. e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i. e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1107, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978).
Under this test, a judge setting bail in a bail hearing is a classic situation of a judge exercising a judicial function. It is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties in the courtroom for that bail hearing clearly know they are before a court with a judge sitting in his judicial capacity.
A judge is only liable in a suit for damages for judicial acts if the judge had a complete lack of jurisdiction.
Rather, our cases make clear that the immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S., at 227–229, 108 S.Ct., at 544–545; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S., at 360, 98 S.Ct., at 1106. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id., at 356–357, 98 S.Ct., at 1104–1105; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 351.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991).
What is within a judge's jurisdiction is explained by the Tennessee courts as follows:
An act is within a judge's jurisdiction if the subject matter is within the scope of his or her jurisdiction, and the scope of the judge's jurisdiction is to be construed broadly in questions of judicial immunity, and immunity will not be removed unless there is a “clear absence of all jurisdiction”. Id.
Hickman v. Brown, No. E200202020COAR3CV, 2003 WL 192159, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003).
But your claim is that the STATE lacked jurisdiction over non commercial use of vehicles. You are wrong on that, for the reasons I stated in your other thread. However, even if you were correct, that is a very different matter than whether the judge had jurisdiction to decide the bail issue. The law clearly gives judges the jurisdiction to decide bail for defendants charged with a crime — that is, setting bail is within the scope of the judge's jurisdiction. This for the judge's jurisdiction has nothing to do with the state's power to regulate noncommercial driving. Conflating the two is an application of poor logic.
As for that New York Times article, the Supreme Court's ruling in that case was very narrow: "We conclude that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity." Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1981, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984). Prospective injunctive relief cases are pretty rare, and yours is not a situation in which that kind of relief would apply. You cannot get money damages in such a case either though as the court said you could win attorney's fees if you won the injunction. The problem is that when proceeding pro se (without an attorney) you don't get attorney's fees for the simple reason that you had no attorney.