Driving is clearly a privilege and not a right. You have made the classic mistake here that so many others have when trying to make the argument that driving is a right and that therefore the state may not require a license to drive in the state or require titling and registration of vehicles: you are looking at cases that do not directly address the issue of whether driving is a privilege or a right and instead relying on cases that discuss privilege in other contexts or only in a general way and ignoring the cases that do actually specifically address whether driving is privilege. I suspect that is the case because you simply copied the arguments from some web site on the issue rather than undertaking your own research into the matter as that is what most people I have seen make this line argument do. In any event, I'll give you the key cases in Tennessee that directly address the issue of whether driving is a privilege and whether driver's license law and vehicle registration laws violate your right to travel, which may help avoid a whole second round of discussion on the right to travel issue.
As it turns out, the Tennessee Supreme Court made about as clear a statement on the matter as you can hope to find regarding whether driving is a right or privilege:
The driving of an automobile is a privilege, not a property right, and is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare.
Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930, 932 (1940). The Court goes on to cite with approval the explanation of the issue provided in 5 Am. Jur. 593 at the time:
§ 157. “The statutes regulating the granting of operators' licenses or drivers' permits usually provide for their revocation. It is competent for the legislature to prescribe the conditions under which the privilege of operating an automobile on the public highways may be exercised. The fact that the license or permit was granted under a statute or ordinance which stated that it should be perpetual unless revoked as provided in such statute or ordinance, and which contained no provision for revocation, does not preclude revocation under a provision introduced by subsequent amendment.
“A license to operate an automobile is not property, but a mere privilege, the suspension of which does not deprive the licensee of his property without due process of law. The licenses or permits may not be revoked arbitrarily.
“The authority to revoke cannot be delegated to an official without prescribing what shall constitute grounds for revocation.”
§ 158. “The power of the state to deprive a person of a license to operate a motor vehicle until he has satisfied a prior judgment against him in an action for damages resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle is generally sustained.”
Id. That case has never been overturned or superceded and remains good law in the state today. Indeed, a much more recent Tennessee appellate court case relied in part on Sullins decision to affirm that driving is a privilege and also addressed the issue whether the right to travel argument as well in affirming that the state may require a person to have a driver's license and to require registration of vehicles:
In the present case, the appellant asserts that the State of Tennessee has unduly infringed upon his “right to travel” by requiring licensing and registration of his motor vehicles prior to operation on the public roadways of this state. However, contrary to his assertions, at no time did the State of Tennessee place constraints upon the appellant's exercise of this right. His right to travel within this state or to points beyond its boundaries remains unimpeded. Thus, not only has the appellant's right to freedom of travel not been infringed, but also, we cannot conclude that this right is even implicated in this case. Rather, based upon the context of his argument, the appellant asserts an infringement upon his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state. This notion is wholly separate from the right to travel.
The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a fundamental “right.” See Goats v. State, 211 Tenn. 249, 364 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tenn.1963) (emphasis added); Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tenn.1940) (citations omitted). Instead, it is a revocable “privilege” that is granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures. See Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36, 62 S.Ct. 24, 26–27, 86 L.Ed. 21 (1941), overruled in part by, Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971); Goats, 364 S.W.2d at 891; Sullins, 135 S.W.2d at 932.
State and local governments possess an inherent power, i.e. police power, to enact reasonable legislation for the health, safety, welfare, morals, or convenience of the public. See Nashville, C & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 79 L.Ed. 949 (1935); Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657, 430 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn.1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 318, 89 S.Ct. 554, 21 L.Ed.2d 513 (1969); State v. Sowder, 826 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991), appeal dismissed, (Tenn.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 883, 114 S.Ct. 229, 126 L.Ed.2d 184 (1993). Thus, our legislature, through its police power, may prescribe conditions under which the “privilege” of operating automobiles on public highways may be exercised. Sullins, 135 S.W.2d at 932. See also Goats, 364 S.W.2d at 891.
State v. Booher, 978 S.W.2d 953, 955–56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Again, this case remains good law in the state today. And note that it cites not only the Sullins case in reaching its decision but the U.S. Supreme Court as well.
Also addressing the right to travel argument is another Tennessee appellate decision:
The defendant argues that Code section 55–50–301 is unconstitutional because the statute's requirement that he obtain a license to drive has a chilling effect on his federal constitutional right to travel freely in the United States. This court has previously considered and rejected this same argument. See Booher, 978 S.W.2d at 955; see also, e.g., State v. Paul Williams, a/k/a Paul Williams El, No. W2014–00231–CCA–R3–CD, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 7, 2015).
In Booher, Booher, who had been convicted of violating the registration law and driving without a license, argued in the trial court “that he was only exercising his right as an ‘unenfranchised citizen of Tennessee’ to use his private property on the public highway over which every citizen has a right to pass” and that, “because he was not engaged in commerce, his vehicle was not required to be registered.”1 Id. at 955. Booher argued that those statutes requiring him to register his vehicle and obtain a driver's license before operating a motor vehicle on the public roads of this state impeded his constitutional right to freely travel throughout the state. We explained, however, that although every American enjoys “a fundamental right to freedom of travel,” “[t]ravel, in the constitutional sense ... means more than locomotion; it means migration with the intent to settle and abide.” Id. (citations omitted). Observing that the freedom “to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state” was a notion “wholly separate from the right to travel,” see id., we reiterated that “[t]he ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a fundamental ‘right’ ” but is instead “a revocable ‘privilege’ that is granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures,” see id. at 956 (citations omitted). We concluded that “our legislature, through its police power, may prescribe conditions under which the ‘privilege’ of operating automobiles on public highways may be exercised” and that “[r]equiring persons to obtain a driver's license and to register their automobiles with the State” was a reasonable exercise of that power. Id.
We see no reason to depart from the reasoning in Booher and conclude that Code section 55–50–301 is not unconstitutional.
State v. Schmitz, No. M201402377CCAR3CD, 2015 WL 12978196, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2015).
I could cite cases in other jurisdictions, too, that directly address the issue of whether driving is a privilege and whether a driver's license requirement or requirement for registration of vehicles violates your right to travel and they'd all reach the same conclusion: driving is a privilege that the state may regulate by, among other things, requiring a license and requiring titling and registration of vehicles and that such laws not not violate your constitutional right to travel. In the face of Tennessee cases that directly discuss driving your cited cases that do not involve driving do not help you. Moreover, the cases you cited tend to be older, in some instances much older, than the cases I presented and to the extent they conflict the more recent cases I cited would be controlling over the older ones.