None of those cases say that a state cannot require a license to drive an automobile. The cases that do directly address the issue say exactly the opposite:
In the present case, the appellant asserts that the State of Tennessee has unduly infringed upon his “right to travel” by requiring licensing and registration of his motor vehicles prior to operation on the public roadways of this state. However, contrary to his assertions, at no time did the State of Tennessee place constraints upon the appellant's exercise of this right. His right to travel within this state or to points beyond its boundaries remains unimpeded. Thus, not only has the appellant's right to freedom of travel not been infringed, but also, we cannot conclude that this right is even implicated in this case. Rather, based upon the context of his argument, the appellant asserts an infringement upon his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state. This notion is wholly separate from the right to travel.
The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a fundamental “right.” See Goats v. State, 211 Tenn. 249, 364 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tenn.1963) (emphasis added); Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tenn.1940) (citations omitted). Instead, it is a revocable “privilege” that is granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures. See Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36, 62 S.Ct. 24, 26–27, 86 L.Ed. 21 (1941), overruled in part by, Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971); Goats, 364 S.W.2d at 891; Sullins, 135 S.W.2d at 932.
State and local governments possess an inherent power, i.e. police power, to enact reasonable legislation for the health, safety, welfare, morals, or convenience of the public. See Nashville, C & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 79 L.Ed. 949 (1935); Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657, 430 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn.1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 318, 89 S.Ct. 554, 21 L.Ed.2d 513 (1969); State v. Sowder, 826 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991), appeal dismissed, (Tenn.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 883, 114 S.Ct. 229, 126 L.Ed.2d 184 (1993). Thus, our legislature, through its police power, may prescribe conditions under which the “privilege” of operating automobiles on public highways may be exercised. Sullins, 135 S.W.2d at 932. See also Goats, 364 S.W.2d at 891.
State v. Booher, 978 S.W.2d 953, 955–56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
And these federal appeals cases:
We have previously held that burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right to interstate travel. See Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1972) (“A rich man can choose *1206 to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man's lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”); City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir.1982) (“At most, [the air carrier plaintiffs'] argument reduces to the feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel. That notion, as any experienced traveler can attest, finds no support whatsoever in [the Supreme Court's right of interstate travel jurisprudence] or in the airlines' own schedules.”). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Berberian v. Petit, 118 R.I. 448, 374 A.2d 791 (1977), put it this way:
The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right.374 A.2d at 794 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Miller does not have a fundamental “right to drive.”
Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 1999).
But Dean has not articulated reasons to support his unexplained argument that state licensure and registration requirements violate the right to travel, see Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9). This is not surprising because such an argument is meritless. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that there is no “fundamental right to drive” and affirming dismissal of complaint based on state's refusal to renew citizen's driver's license); Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1477 (9th Cir.1993) (finding no constitutional violation where valid Idaho law required driver's license, and plaintiff was detained for not having one). Without vehicle licenses, Dean is denied only “a single mode of transportation-in a car driven by himself,” see Miller, 176 F.3d at 1204, and this does not impermissibly burden his right to travel.
Matthew v. Honish, 233 F. App'x 563, 564 (7th Cir. 2007).
Moreover, the Duncans' challenge to the statute does not present a “hybrid situation” as their claim of a violation of their right to travel is frivolous. See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir.1999). While a fundamental right to travel exists, there is no fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle. See id. at 1205-06. A burden on a single mode of transportation simply does not implicate the right to interstate travel. See id. at 1205. Thus, the Duncans' right to freely exercise their religion and their right to travel have not been impermissibly infringed.
Duncan v. Cone, No. 00-5705, 2000 WL 1828089, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000)..
Each one of those cases directly addresses whether a state infringes on the constitutional rights of drivers by requiring them to have a license, and in each case they said that the state may indeed require such licenses. And none of them restricted that power to just commercial licensing either.
And finally, there is this from the U.S. Supreme Court:
The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process.
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36, 62 S. Ct. 24, 26–27, 86 L. Ed. 21 (1941).
It is because of those cases and a number of others like them that you will lose on your constitutional challenges.