Identified As Driver Suspended

[jk]

Actually, rereading his two posts, in his mind he KNEW he was suspended. What he assumed was that he could get away with driving while suspended because an officer let him off the first time around.

Thats what I said. He seemed to be quite aware the suspension had been reinstated.

[budwad]

Where in the majority opinion (which is the only part of the opinion that is case law) do you find support for the assertion that it is not a casual stop if the officer already had reasonable suspicion? The majority opinion says nothing of the sort. The holding of the the majority opinion on Overstreet is this:

The relevant facts are undisputed. The record shows that Paris did not stop Overstreet's vehicle. Overstreet had already stopped his vehicle at a gas station. Neither did Paris stop Overstreet himself. When Paris approached him, Overstreet was using an air hose to pump air into one of his automobile tires. Overstreet was not detained. Paris did not restrict his movement in any way. Paris merely asked Overstreet about his actions at the mailbox and asked him for identification. Overstreet then volunteered that his operator's license was suspended.

We decline to hold that this brief encounter and inquiry constitutes a Terry stop which required a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.[1] Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen amounts to a seizure requiring objective justification. To characterize every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a seizure, while not enhancing any interest guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Indeed, it is not the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to eliminate all contact between police and the citizenry. Id. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870.

As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy to require some particularized and objective justification. Id. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870. Examples of circumstances under which a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. Id. "In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person." Id. at 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870. In this case, there was no such evidence presented. The trial court properly denied Overstreet's motion to suppress.

Nothing in that supports the conclusion you drew.

First, I'm going to disagree with any poster that says that because the defendant's vehicle was already stopped (as in a gas station) it constitutes a casual or consensual stop. There is nothing in Indiana law that articulates that that I could find. A casual stop is a brief investigational encounter without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.

You correctly point out that in a casual stop it is the perception of authority that may influence the encounter as to whether or not a person is free to leave. The presence of a uniformed officer approaching a defendant and saying, “I know your suspended, I need to see your license” would give a person the impression that he could just get in his car and leave the encounter. That may give rise to resisting arrest of much worse.

in Overstreet, the officer had no reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime was under foot. He observed Overstreet checking a mailbox and then driving away. If Overstreet was a newspaper delivery guy, maybe he was looking for his check. Or maybe Overstreet was retrieving mail for a friend. The casual stop lead to the arrest of Overstreet for driving on the suspended list.

That is not what happened to OP. Here, OP was approached by a uniformed officer with knowledge that OP was on the suspension list. And depending on what he was actually charged with (could be a misdemeanor or it could be a felony depending on the circumstances), the officer already had reasonable suspicion of a crime if OP was the driver of the vehicle.

In this case, for example, what was a casual investigatory inquire ended up being reviewed by the applet court as a Forth Amendment issue.

We therefore proceed from the premise that Dahlin was subjected to an investigative stop, which implicates the Fourth Amendment

[cdwjava]

Yep. The officer apparently stated, "“I know your [sic] suspended, I need to see your license”. And, lo and behold, the OP WAS suspended! Good call on the officer's part.

Nothing untoward occurred there.

[budwad]

But not a casual stop. That is the point. The officer already knew of the suspension. Is that a confusion concept for you? Then you don't understand what a casual stop is under the law.

[flyingron]

If the officer knew who the person was and had personal knowledge of the suspension, this is way beyond worrying about the validity of the stop. This is probable cause for the arrest.

If the officer knew the car was owned by a suspended driver and hadn't identified the driver, then he's free to come up and say "What's your name" or the like, as this is a consensual stop. If the driver says, "I'm Joe Suspended" then that's all he needs for the arrest as well.

Mens rea and all the other aspects really don't enter into it at this point. That can be brought up in court.

[cdwjava]

But not a casual stop. That is the point. The officer already knew of the suspension. Is that a confusion concept for you? Then you don't understand what a casual stop is under the law.

You're right. It was not a "casual stop", if, by "casual stop" you mean that the contact is NOT a detention. Because, once the officer made a demand that he needed to see his license, the matter became a detention.

What's your point? The officer knew of the suspension, made contact, and confirmed the suspension. Yay.

[Taxing Matters]

First, I'm going to disagree with any poster that says that because the defendant's vehicle was already stopped (as in a gas station) it constitutes a casual or consensual stop. There is nothing in Indiana law that articulates that that I could find. A casual stop is a brief investigational encounter without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.

Bud, the problem is that there is no definition in federal or Indiana appellate case law that defines the term "casual stop". You are making up a definition for the term, but that is your definition, not necessarily what the law says. Constitutionally, what matters when a cop engages in contact with a person is whether the contacted person is being stopped or detained. If the officer has reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed then the officer may stop the person and briefly detain the person to investigate that. If the officer does not have the reasonable suspicion then the officer cannot make the stop or detain the person. However, cops are free like any other person to simply walk up to someone and start a conversation. So long the person would feel free to terminate the conversation and go that is what the federal courts seem to most often refer to as a "causal encounter" to differentiate it from a Terry "stop". The Supreme Court explains it this way:

Second, law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2255 n. 12, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31, 32–33, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1885–1886, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 34, 88 S.Ct., at 1886 (WHITE, J., concurring). Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 32–33, 88 S.Ct., at 1885–1886 (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 34, 88 S.Ct., at 1886 (WHITE, J., concurring). He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds. United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S., at 556, 100 S.Ct., at 1878 (opinion of Stewart, J.). If there is no detention—no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—then no constitutional rights have been infringed.

Florida. v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983).

Note that the inquiry here focuses on whether the person is free to go; i.e. whether there is any detention. That turns on how the situation is viewed by the person being contacted, not whether the officer has reasonable suspicion. So the officer could have reasonable suspicion something is going on, but still engage in a casual encounter. The person contacted in that situation would be free to leave at any time. Now, the officer could change that to a Terry stop detention if he has reasonable suspicion at which point the defendant would NOT be free to leave. He is now detained.

An unpublished opinion of the Sixth Circuit has a nice explanation in a concurring opinion, I think:

Not all police encounters with the public are fourth amendment seizures of the Terry type, as it is recognized that the police have the right to address people conversationally with the hope of voluntary exchange without meeting the standards of the fourth amendment. United States v. Garcia, 866 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir.1989). As such, the police have the right to ask member of the public for identification, United States v. Collis, 766 F.2d 219, 221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851 (1985), can question an individual in a non-threatening manner, United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 808 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983), and can ask to examine an individual's airplane ticket, Saperstein, 723 F.2d at 1227. However, permissible police encounters may escalate into Terry -type stops. Circumstances which might indicate that a permissible encounter has been elevated into a Terry stop include: “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person, or use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.

United States v. Byfield, 948 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1991).

So, it can still be a casual encounter if the person is free to go — i.e. nothing suggests he is detained. The cop could have reasonable suspicion in his head, but if he does nothing to indicate that the person is detained it is still a casual encounter and the 4th Amendment is not applicable. It is only at the point of detention that we ask: did the officer have the necessary reasonable suspicion?

Here, the OP was parked at a gas station. So the cop could have come up to him and start a conversation. No violation of the Constitution whether the cop had reasonable suspicion or not. And that would be a casual encounter up to the point the officer said or did something that would make it appear the person was detained. At that point he'd need the reasonable suspicion and we start looking at the rules for Terry stops. Here the officer had the reasonable suspicion from the start, apparently, so he was entitled to detain the OP from the start and there is still no Constitutional violation. Either way, it appears to be a good contact by the cop and the citation isn't subject to attack on 4th Amendment grounds.

[budwad]

I am not and have not argued that the stop was subject to the 4th amendment. I was responding to the posters that said this was a casual stop because the defendant's car was stopped in a gas station. That is what I disagreed with. I think you proved my point.

[cdwjava]

Had the officer not demanded to see ID, then it may have been seen as a "casual" stop, or, as we refer to it in most places, a "consensual contact" (i.e. a NON detention). Even in this scenario, an argument might be made that it was not a detention. But, as it appears there was sufficient cause to detain and investigate the likely suspended license, it's moot.

[jk]

Since the op was already physically stopped, until the cop acted in a manner that would be defined as a detention, it was still a casual or consensual matter until the cop asked for the license. Whether it is consensual or not, as supported by taxiing matters post is not what the cop knew but whether the person believed they were detained. Regardless anything budwad says otherwise, neither the law nor taxing matters posts says otherwise.

Here, the OP was parked at a gas station. So the cop could have come up to him and start a conversation. No violation of the Constitution whether the cop had reasonable suspicion or not. And that would be a casual encounter up to the point the officer said or did something that would make it appear the person was detained. At that point he'd need the reasonable suspicion and we start looking at the rules for Terry stops. Here the officer had the reasonable suspicion from the start, apparently, so he was entitled to detain the OP from the start and there is still no Constitutional violation. Either way, it appears to be a good contact by the cop and the citation isn't subject to attack on 4th Amendment grounds.

i read taxing matters post that it was “casual” or consensual until the cop acted in a manner that made the op believe he was not free to go. The case law appears to support that same statement. Therefor, it was initially a “casual” contact (since there was no stop involved at all) until the cop asked for the id. Once the cop asked for the id it became a detention.