We're also free to revolt and restructure under state and federal law.
We're also free to revolt and restructure under state and federal law.
"84 replies | 1748 view(s)"....looks like the public are taking quite an interest in this thread.
What exactly do you think the outcome of the revolutionary war was? I hope you don't think it was the US Constitution because it wasn't written until 5 years after the war ended. If you mean violating the constitution then say that and point out how whatever you are talking about violates a specific part of the constitution.
P.S. Disrespecting the constitution is one of the freedoms given by the constitution.
noun: outcome; plural noun: outcomes
the way a thing turns out; a consequence.
It is quite clear that: Sections 56.54 & 86.09(e) provide: "'Public park' means any property designated, dedicated or developed by or on behalf of the City  for park  use. 'Parking lot' means those parking lots contained within public parks. No person shall park or stand a vehicle in violation of any sign or curb marking limiting or regulating the parking or standing of a vehicle".
Section 81.0102 provides: 'parking, park' or 'parked' means to stand or leave standing any unoccupied vehicle, other than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading materials". ("Definitions" added 8-5-2013 by O-20281 N.S.; effective 9-4-2013)...
...regardless of being there any time between 10 and 6 in parking lots contained within public parks...there are no "No Trespassing" signs posted in the public place...policy does not trump ordinance nor state statutory law....and the Fair Notice doctrine would apply under the assertion of a "trespassing" charge.
What is PUBLIC?
Pertaining to a whole community; proceeding from, relating to the whole body of people or an entire community.
Open to all;
Common to all; open to common use. Morgan v. Cree, 46 Vt. 786, 14 Am. Rep. 640; Crane v. Waters (C. C.) 10 Fed. 621; Austin v. Soule, 36 Vt. 650; Appeal of Eliot, 74 Coun. 586, 51 Atl. 558; 0’IIara v. Miller, 1 Kulp (Pa.) 295.
trespass to the person historically involved six separate trespasses: threats, assault, battery, wounding, mayhem (or maiming), and false imprisonment. Through the evolution of the common law in various jurisdictions, and the codification of common law torts, most jurisdictions now broadly recognize three trespasses to the person: assault, which is "any act of such a nature as to excite an apprehension of battery"; battery, "any intentional and unpermitted contact with the plaintiff's person or anything attached to it and practically identified with it"; and false imprisonment, the "unlawful obstruction or deprivation of freedom from restraint of movement".
Trespass to land is a common law tort or crime that is committed when an individual intentionally enters the land of another without a lawful excuse. "[A]t common law, every unauthorized entry upon the soil of another was a trespasser"; however, under the tort scheme established by the Restatement of Torts, liability for unintentional intrusions arises only under circumstances evincing negligence or where the intrusion involved a highly dangerous activity.
Not very reasonable to "suspect" non-criminal activity, nor tortious conduct for that matter, that involves the lawful excuse of a reasonably forseeable purpose.
Besides, a person can still make a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause even if the officer was found to have had probable cause for the stop under the Fourth Amendment. Which he factually did not.
The notion that common law offenses could be enforced in federal courts was found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). At the state level, the situation varies.
"When signs are used in place of a red curb, the prohibition is in effect on the days and times specified on the sign...No person shall park or stand a vehicle in violation of any sign limiting or regulating the parking or standing of a vehicle"...That means, one would have to be "parked" or had left "standing" to be in "violation" of the sign "limiting or regulating" the act of "parking or standing of a vehicle"...You know...standing...something you wouldn't have as a prosecutor.
False arrest acts as a legal defense and is an appropriate ground on which to base a California appeal. Here, the question before the court is precisely whether the officer's conduct was an objectively reasonable search.
The attenuation inquiry is essentially a proximate cause analysis. It asks whether the fruit of the search is tainted by the initial, unlawful detention, or whether the taint is dissipated by an intervening circumstance. CA-EVID § 664 provides: "It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. This presumption does not apply on an issue as to the lawfulness of an arrest if it is found or otherwise established that the arrest was made without a warrant".
The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual[s]. United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 807.
If a detention turns into a de facto arrest, it becomes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer has probable cause to arrest. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981). Under California law, an investigatory detention is a "law enforcement action" pursuant to CA-PEN § 1463(a), which is defined as an "arrest", thus a pretextual, investigatory detention for the non-criminal "offense" should legally be deemed an "arrest", albeit an illegal arrest, especially when weighed in the context of attempted "fines and forfeitures" potentially being "imposed and collected".
Whether a police detention is an arrest or an investigative stop is a fact-specific inquiry made "by evaluating not only how intrusive the stop was, but also whether the methods used [by police] were reasonable given the specific circumstances". Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original) quoted in Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2002).
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court noted, "It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person". A statement of the test as to whether a detention had occurred is: "the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts which, viewed objectively, would cause a reasonable officer to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person the officer intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity". People v. Conway, 25 Cal. App. 4Th 385, 388 (1994).
Whether a seizure is "an arrest or an investigatory stop depends on what the officers did, not on how they characterize what they did". Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2002). This is an objective test based on what the officer said and did, and therefore, the officer and the person's subjective beliefs are irrelevant. To be objective, the test must be based on an unbiased attitude or opinion that is based on factual evidence, and the recognition and protection of individual rights. Non-verbal factors include the use of patrol car lights and blocking the person's path.
A police officer is authorized to detain a person [only] when the officer has "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity". United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); People v. Souza, 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 (1991).
An officer's "brief and cursory" holding and questioning someone is a detention. Investigatory stops (or "detentions") must be no longer than necessary and officers must investigate with the least intrusive means that are reasonably available. The police may ask people who have legitimately been stopped for identification without conducting a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004).
In Hiibel, the Supreme Court held an officer may arrest a suspect for his refusing to orally identify himself during an investigative detention if a state statute requires the person to do so. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004); at 178. 1However, California does not have such a law after Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Regardless, the Hiibel Court did not address the issue of whether an officer can 2require the detainee to produce written identification.
In contrast, if the officer has a legal basis to issue a person a citation for any offense, that person must provide satisfactory evidence of identification. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) the Supreme Court unanimously held that where police have probable cause to stop traffic offenders, a pretextual motive cannot invalidate the stop.
In United States v. McCraney, 674 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2012), the defendants were outside the car, surrounded by several law enforcement officers. A search of the car was not a valid search incident to arrest.
In United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2011), the police stopped an automobile. The stop was found to be improper, because there was no articulable suspicion supporting the stop. The Sixth Circuit held that the exclusionary rule did apply and the evidence would be suppressed.
In United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit held that because the stop was illegal, the search was the fruit of that illegality.
In United States v. Patzer, 277 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002), absent probable cause to arrest the defendant, the ensuing search of his automobile could not be justified as a search incident to arrest. Similarly, the defendant’s consent was tainted by the unlawful arrest.
In United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2002), regarding probable cause, at most there was some indication that there had been a simple assault, but that had not occurred in the officer's presence and thus he could not arrest the defendant for that offense.
In United States v. Johnson, 16 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1994), aff’d on rehearing, 18 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994), an object (briefcase) was not within the reach of the defendant at the time of the arrest; therefore it was not a valid search incident to arrest. The defendant was never handcuffed and the officer conceded that he did not fear that the defendant had a weapon, or that he would destroy evidence.
In United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1993), the defendant was arrested approximately thirty feet away from his car. The police searched his glove compartment. This was not a proper search incident to arrest. While Belton allows a search of the entire contents of the car, even after the defendant is removed, the initial stop must occur when the defendant is in the car.
In United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1988), the defendant was stopped by a police officer who suspected that he was driving with a suspended license. The search of the automobile was improper and the Motion to Suppress should have been granted.
A public officer also acts under color when, while not compelled by law, he acts within the range of legally authorized discretion in enforcing state and local law. (Hague v. CIO (1939) ; Bible Believers v. Wayne County (6th Cir. 2015)).
In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 , 29 S.Ct. 14, 20, it was stated that due process requires that "no change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards those fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action, which have relation to process of law, and protect the [individual] in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government".
In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 90 A.L.R. 575, it was said that due process prevents state action which 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' The same standard was expressed in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, in terms of a 'scheme of ordered liberty.'
And, operating under the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, it should be noted: that which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.' Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 , 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1256.
The encounter was factually predicated on an illegal detention under "MC § 63.0102; Overnight Camping", the only remotely applicable one of the vaguely stated "park regulations", and the officer also noted in his official statement that there was no "Camping" equipment in Plaintiff's car, thus Gant and Chimel rationale did not apply. The officers' actions lacked any relevant, countervailing interest, of any otherwise legitimate importance whatsoever, to reasonably justify themselves of initiating the encounter.
Evidence of the encounter's "pretextual" nature is additionally demonstrated by the fact that officer ****** refused to inform Plaintiff of the nature and cause of his accusation under CA-PEN § 841, upon his arrival, and is obviously the essential motive to delete the audio portion of the BWC footage, visibly apparent prior to the deletion, and prior to providing it months after it was compelled (Comp. 11/29/2017; Prov. 03/02/2018). It took the prosecution 3 months to figure out how to defeat the argument stated in the counterclaim/cross-complaint Accused filed, and served to DCA *******, in open court on 01/22/2018, wherein he discribed the statement he made to officer *********, regarding Terry requirements of articulable suspicion. They simply deleted the BWC audio portion of said statement, which served as the base rationale behind their seeking of a Protective Order, prior to production of the footage, as previously compelled, as there was no complaining party or witnesses to protect by virtue of redaction. The foregoing demonstrates knowledge of the Constitutional violation, and the motive to attempt covering it up.
Municipal Code section 63.0102(b)(12) provides: It is "unlawful" to do any of the acts enumerated. There are five specifically enumerated acts under section 63.0102(b)(12), but section 63.0102(b)(12) fails to clearly state on its face, what punishment may be imposed. The five specifically enumerated acts are "camp, lodge, sleep, tarry", and "overnight". Section 63.0102(b)(12) fails to adequately state whether to "camp", "lodge", "sleep", or "tarry", need be accomplished with or without a car, tent, cardboard box, or otherwise, or need be accomplished in individual spaces, intended for parking cars.
Since Municipal Code section 63.0102(b)(12) fails to adequately state, on its face, whether it is classified as a "misdemeanor" or an "infraction", it cannot qualify as reasonably trustworthy information sufficient enough to lead a prudent person to believe that the express enumerated acts, would constitute either a "misdemeanor" or an "infraction", thereby warranting no apparent authority for a "violation" thereof to occur, or what punishment to expect. The term "unlawful" is intentionally vague.
The framing of Municipal Code section 63.0102(b)(12) is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, thereby no one is legally bound to obey it, and no courts are bound to enforce it. See: 16Am Jur 2d., § 256.
Since Municipal Code section 63.0102(b)(12) is, in fact, punishable by a $135 fine, a reasonably prudent individual, acting in good faith, would be deem it an infraction, consistent with CA-PEN § 19.8(b). An arrest for the commission of an infraction cannot be made between the hours of 10 o'clock p.m. of any day and 6 o'clock a.m. of the succeeding day, unless made in a public place, pursuant to CA-PEN § 840(2). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer can make a custodial warrantless arrest for any crime, including an infraction. An officer’s violation of the state statutory requirements for misdemeanor arrests and infractions is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause, however, is still required. Municipal Code section 12.0201, cl.2 provides in pertinent part that: "any violation of the provisions relating to parking, operation of  vehicles, and use of freeways, highways and streets by  vehicles or pedestrians  shall constitute an infraction".
According to the public entity's "official" website: "Parking citations/tickets are not criminal offenses", therefore any presumed "violation" of a "parking lot regulation" is not "criminal" in nature. An infraction would elicit and constitute grounds for a non-custodial field-citation release. However, an infraction would have to first, have been committed, in reasonably articulabe fact, for the arrest to occur.
A "No Parking" between the hours of 10 o'clock p.m. of any day and 6 o'clock a.m. of the succeeding day, sign would indicate to a reasonably prudent individual, that it exists for the sole purpose of limiting or regulating the parking or standing of a vehicle. Municipal Code section 81.0102 provides: 'parking, park' or 'parked' means to stand or leave standing any unoccupied vehicle, other than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in loading or unloading materials". ("Definitions" added 8-5-2013 by O-20281 N.S.; effective 9-4-2013). Plaintiff was not in violation of "parking regulations", including those found under Municipal Code Ch.8 Art.1 or 6.
At the relevant time, Plaintiff had not remained in or at a campsite for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a temporary place to live; nor did he become firmly fixed or embedded in the particular place; nor was he in a resting state in which the body was not active and the mind unconscious for the duration of a night; nor had he stopped or stayed lasting one night in the particular place; nor was he lingering in expectation of anything, because he was actually engaged in loading; nor had he remained for the duration of a night, as a reasonably prudent individual should know that one "night" is from sunset to sunrise, approximately 8:01 p.m. until 5:59 a.m., therefore Plaintiff was not in the act of "Overnight Camping, Sleeping, Lodging, or Tarrying". Plaintiff was in the public parking lot "at night", but he was not in the public parking lot "Overnight", a duration of time expressed on the signage as "10:00pm to 6:00am". Plaintiff had arrived in the public parking lot at 2pm the preceding afternoon.
Defendant, officer ********* officially reported: "On O6/27/17, I was enforcing the parking lot regulations, there was a male packing up the vehicle, a white Nissan Altima (CA *******) 'in vlolation of the park regulations'". Is there a legally recognized difference between "packing up" and "loading"??? It's highly doubtful there is.
Police Department Policy Manual §§ 9.15 & 9.16 provide: "unsatisfactory performance may be demonstrated by, but is not limited to, a lack of knowledge of the application of laws required to be enforced", and "members shall not make any arrest that they know is not in accordance with law and established Department procedures".
Police Department Policy Manual § 9.28 provides: "Reports submitted by members shall be truthful and no member shall knowingly enter, or cause to be entered, any inaccurate, false or improper information". To enter, or cause to be entered, any inaccurate, false or improper information is a violation of CA-PEN § 118.1, because "every peace officer who files any report with the agency which employs him regarding any investigation of any 'crime', if he knowingly and intentionally makes any statement regarding any material matter in the report which the officer knows to be false, whether or not the statement is certified or otherwise expressly reported as true, is guilty of filing a false report punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year, or in the state prison for one, two, or three years".
Under CA-PEN § 833.5(a) "reasonable cause to detain" requires that the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that some offense has taken place or is occurring or is about to occur and that the person he intends to detain is involved in that offense. If the officer maintains that he had witnessed a "crime" being committed in his presence, he would first be required to articulate with specificity, the circumstances known or apparent to him that led him to believe his pretextual motive was justified.
Municipal Code Ch. 6 Art.3, contains 12 separate provisions pertaining to the subject matter relevant to the pretext of the encounter, and only one thereof would have been applicable, had it factually been violated. The ambiguity proffered by officer ********* merely as "the park regulations", fails to point to specific and articulable facts relevant to the pretext of the encounter, and demonstrates his intent to dissuade attention from the minutiae of the unconstitutional ordinance, rendering his statement false.
Plaintiff was not in "violation" of "park or parking" regulations pursuant to Municipal Code sections 63.0102; 81.0102, or CA-VEH § 463, nor was his "white Nissan Altima", because he was, temporarily, for the reasonably forseeable intended purpose of, and while actually engaged in, loading his car with his personal property, i.e. "materials", e.g. tools and "toolboxes", he used to repair his "machining tools", i.e. "merchandise", and therefore neither he nor his car, were "parked" or left "standing". Officer ******** even noted in his "official" report that: "The car was filled with tool boxes and machining tools", i.e. "merchandise", not "camping" or "lodging" equipment, therefore there was no evidence relevant to the false arrest. There was no basis to search incident to the false arrest. Officers must understand that an arrest under the Fourth Amendment must be justified by the higher standard of probable cause.
Municipalities are creatures of our law and are created as political subdivisions of the state as a convenient agency for the exercise of such powers as are conferred upon them by the state. They represent no sovereignty distinct from the state and possess only such powers and privileges as have been expressly or impliedly conferred upon them. All acts done by them must find authority in the law of their creation. City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542, 4 S.W. 143; Southwestern Telegraph Telephone Co. v. City of Dallas, 104 Tex. 114, 134 S.W. 321; Southwestern Telegraph Telephone Co. v. City of Dallas, 174 S.W. 636, writ refused, error dismissed 248 U.S. 590, 39 Sup.Ct. 7, 63 L.Ed. 435; Walker v. City of Richmond, 173 Ky. 26, 189 S.W. 1122, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1084.
For governmental liability to attach, there must be some link between official policy and the ultimate commission of a legal injury.
And even with all your verbosity we do realize you are working on POST conviction relief. I guess all that you know hasn’t benefitted you yet.
I don’t remember if you have stated what you were convicted of. Would you mind stating that?
well, I believe you’re wrong. What you call disrespecting and violating the outcome of the revolutionary war is one reason we fought the war. We wanted a right to be able to speak out against the governing authority so because of the revolutionary war, we have the right to do that.I also have a propensity for exposing how disrespecting and violating the outcome of the Revolution makes the country worse.
Its no different than those that walk on the flag. We have had many many soldiers die to allow us to express our opinions. Walking on the flag as protest is an expression of one’s opinion and although I am not one to do it, im glad those that do aren’t subjected to prosecution because they do it. Outlawing such expression is subjugation.
Protest is healthy for a country.
Free speech, etc, are not an outcome of the American Revolution, they are an outcome of the creation and ratification of the Constitution. The creation of the USA was the outcome of the war. Also, there were members of the group that wrote the Constitution that wanted monarchs and other aspects of a feudal society. Those ideas, however didn't take root.
You, OP, are not the sole arbiter of, well, anything. Well, with the exception of governing yourself but even that has limitations.
I suspect that you are not a Constitutional scholar, a historian or the like, right? That would mean that you don't have the chops to speak authoritatively about any of this and based on what you've said so far you can't have a moderately intelligent discussion of it without posting these long blocks of drivel that are incoherent and unreadable.
I don't know what you were convicted of, to go on what JK said, but I hope you're representing yourself pro se because you'd definitely have a fool for a client.
"Where do those stairs go?"
"They go up!"
If one wants to get specific, the only thing that came from the American Revolution was a bunch of dead people. In reality, the American Revolution allowed for the creation of the US, the Constitution, and everything that extends from them.