Anderson turned on the applicability of Iowa Code Sec. 907.3(3) to the facts of the case:
Quote Quoting Iowa Code, Sc. 907.3(3)
By record entry at the time of or after sentencing, the court may suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as it may require including commitment to an alternate jail facility or a community correctional residential treatment facility to be followed by a period of probation as specified in section 907.7 , or commitment of the defendant to the judicial district department of correctional services for supervision or services under section 901B.1 at the level of sanctions which the district department determines to be appropriate and the payment of fees imposed under section 905.14 . A person so committed who has probation revoked shall not be given credit for such time served. However , a person committed to an alternate jail facility or a community correctional residential treatment facility who has probation revoked shall be given credit for time served in the facility....
Due to the nature of the defendant' supervision by DCS, the court found that credit was required under that statute:
Quote Quoting Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2011)
Sections 907.3(3) and 901B.1 should be read together to determine when sentencing credit is awarded. Iowa Code section 901 B.1 provides a "corrections continuum" describing five levels of corrections sanctions. The State argues the legislature intended to limit sentencing credit to only jail-like probation sanctions because, otherwise, a defendant would be entitled to sentencing credit for any probation sanction, even unsupervised sanctions such as fines or community service. The State's argument overlooks distinctions between the continuum's different sanction levels and section 907.3(3)'s language restricting sentencing credit to sanctions when the DCS provides "supervision or services."...

Regardless of whether Anderson's sanctions are classified as level three "house arrest" or level two "intensive supervised sanctions," Anderson was "committed" to the DCS for "supervision or services." See State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Iowa 2003) (finding DCS's "administrative supervision of the defendant's probation, checking for compliance and notifying the court when compliance was not forthcoming" to mean the defendant was "subject to supervision" within the meaning of section 905.14(1)). The plain language of section 907.3(3), therefore, entitles Anderson to sentencing credit for his time served subject to electronic monitoring and home supervision.
So the question becomes, what level of sanctions were involved under Sec. 901B.1 and did they rise to the level of commitment of the defendant to the judicial district department of correctional services for supervision or services.