Thank you flyingron.
First, I apologize for not naming my state. I had intended to do so, but I cut and pasted the text of my post in/out of a Word doc (to correct spelling and grammar) and I accidentally deleted that portion of the post in the process. I should have used the spell check function built into the site. The state is Washington.
Second, you make good points.
1. As to the date on which the court sent the Notice of Hearing, it was in fact Day 63 (Day 44 by business days). This is the date on the yellow slip of paper. I mistakenly wrote above that it was the date that I received it. It actually came in the mail a few days later.
2. Good to know on the "may" versus "shall" distinction in IRLJ 2.6 (a) (4). I should have picked up on that.
3. “Upon show of prejudice” in IRLJ 2.6 (a) (4). I can now see that this is what the "may" hinges on in terms of the judge dismissing the Notice of Infraction. One argument that I can think of is that the delay was detrimental in terms of my loss of memory of the event. Sure, I remember the gist of the things, but the details fade over time (as documented by scientific research). To me, this is likely why the rule was included. In this instance, the court took 3 times the time allotted (63 days vs 21 days). The officer is not going to suffer from related memory loss because he is simply going to testify based on his sworn statement (as indicated in other posts in this forum, i.e. the great post by blewis). While I should still have a decent working memory of the incident, it does put me at a disadvantage relative to the prosecution AND this disadvantage was created by a delay by the prosecution. Is this a strong enough case for a "showing of prejudice"? Is there another obvious argument I'm missing?
Thanks again!

