What section of the vehicle code were you charged with violating? If it was 23103, I would get yourself a lawyer. That violation is a misdemeanor. It can carry a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail, a fine of $1000, a 30 day license suspension, or all three. Since the speed isn't an element of the charged offense, it doesn't matter if the officer wrote the wrong speed limit on your ticket. In order to find you guilty of this offense, the prosecution has to prove that you drove a vehicle on a highway, and that you intentionally drove with wanton disregard for the safety of people or property.
Huh? Did you read those two opinions? In both cases the appellate court concluded that 40800 had no bearing the evidence in either case, and that officers who are not assigned to traffic enforcement can still make arrests for vehicle code violations.
Appellant argues that even though Ichikawa and Hernandez were Los Angeles police officers patrolling the streets that evening on specific assignment to concentrate on a heavy burglary occurrence area, they nevertheless attempted to stop the station wagon to enforce Vehicle Code section 22350 and they were out of uniform and using an unmarked vehicle thus section 40800 would apply. But this is not what the statute provides. By its language it applies only to a "traffic officer on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of enforcing the provisions of Division 10 or 11." Moreover section 40800 neither prohibits an officer not in uniform and not in a marked vehicle from detaining and arresting a driver for a speed violation nor makes his actions unlawful. The enforcement provision is found in the prohibition of the use of his testimony in the prosecution of the speeding violation (§ 40804). Section 40800 was not intended to apply in a case in which an officer was on the street for some purpose not connected with vehicle act violations; and it does not forbid him to turn aside from such purpose in order to arrest a driver for a traffic infraction. (People v. Stewart, 107 Cal. App.Supp. 757, 761 [288 P. 57].) Finally, once the officers, even though not in uniform or in a designated patrol car, observed the speeding vehicle in a residential area it was a proper exercise of their authority as peace officers to stop the driver, for they had reasonable cause to believe that the driver of the station wagon had committed a public offense in their presence (§ 836, subd. 1, Pen. Code) "Public offense" includes misdemeanors and traffic infractions as well as felonies.
Regardless of its purpose section 40800, by its plain language, applies only to "traffic officer[s]" whose "exclusive or main purpose" is to enforce traffic laws on the public highways. In his report, Sergeant Phariss states only that he was on "uniformed patrol in an unmarked Placer County Sheriff's Department vehicle." There is no evidence in the administrative record that Sergeant Phariss was a "traffic officer" or that his main duties consisted of traffic enforcement. On the contrary, Phariss appeared to be exercising supervisory duties on the night in question: Rather than make the arrest himself, he requested that Deputy Griggs, "the deputy assigned to the King's Beach area," assist him at the scene; and it was Griggs who conducted the sobriety tests and placed Dyer under formal arrest.
The trial court was not permitted to grant the writ based on speculation or assumptions about the nature and scope of Sergeant Phariss's duties. Without any evidence in the record that Phariss was a traffic officer whose exclusive or primary duty consisted of traffic enforcement, a necessary predicate for the applicability of section 40800 was lacking.
In People v. Dibacco, the court ruled that speeding wasn't a lesser included offense of reckless driving, because the statutory definition of reckless driving allows for the crime to be committed even when somebody is not speeding. That is, it's possible to drive recklessly even if you aren't exceeding the speed limit.
"[A]n offense is necessarily included in the charged offense if under the statutory definition of the charged offense it cannot be committed without committing the lesser offense, ... [Citation.]" (People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 517, fn. 4, 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303; see also People v. Steele (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 212, 217, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 458.) Reckless driving is statutorily defined as driving any vehicle in a "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property...." (Veh.Code § 23103.) Since one can drive recklessly at speeds below 100 miles per hour, the speeding charge is not necessarily included in the reckless driving charge.
You need to disabuse yourself of the notion that only traffic officers can make traffic arrests, because the case law is clear that this isn't true. More than that, reckless driving isn't statutorily based upon the speed of the vehicle, although juries can certainly consider the defendant's speed if it's presented as evidence. The important part of the criminal act is intentionally driving with wanton disregard for people and / or property.