
Quoting
STATE v. DESANTIAGO, 97 Wn. App. 446 (1999) at 451
We evaluate the constitutional validity of this stop by the requirements of article I, section 7, of our state constitution, not the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). In Ladson, the court held article I, section 7, of the state constitution has broader application than does the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, [457], 755 P.2d 775 (1988), article I, section 7, was interpreted independently of the Fourth Amendment in the context of the same legal issue which is present in this case, namely warrantless stops of automobiles for the purpose of investigation. Id. at 348 (citations omitted). A pretextual traffic stop violates article I, section 7, because it is a warrantless seizure. Id. at 358.
The Ladson court noted a fundamental difference between the detention of a citizen for the purpose of discovering evidence of crimes and a community caretaking stop aimed at enforcing the traffic code. Id. at 358 n.10. The essence of a pretextual traffic stop is that the police stop a citizen, not to enforce the traffic code, but to investigate suspicions unrelated to driving. Id. at 351. Here, as in Ladson, "[t]he question [is] whether the fact that someone has committed a traffic offense, such as failing to signal or eating while driving, justifies a warrantless seizure which would not otherwise be permitted absent that 'authority of law' represented by a warrant." Id. at 352. Ladson clearly answers that question: "Article I, section 7, forbids use of pretext as a justification for a warrantless search or seizure because our constitution requires we look beyond the formal justification for the stop to the actual one." Id. at 353.
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