Red Light Ticket After Being Confused by Traffic Lights

[That Guy]

Not sure that I follow. Many people transmit sensitive data on the internet, but it is still subject to interception, modification, and theft. This is why encryption and authentication are required for most financial transactions. Even with those safeguards in place, the news is full of examples of cases where computers were broken into, and sensitive personal information was stolen. ACH fraud is common place. Consumer banking laws require banks to reimburse their individual customers for fraudulent transactions, but the same rules do not apply to business banking. Computer hackers routinely target small-businesses, and then use the ACH system to transfer stolen money all over the place. Despite being an electronic system, most banks have a hard time catching this fraud until after it occurs. They're often unable -- or unwilling -- to recover the stolen money for their customers.

You may not agree, but given the ease with which computer systems are hacked, I think it's entirely reasonable to require the prosecution to show that the image presented in court is the same image that was captured by the electronic system. Also, given how prevalent defects are in computer software, it's also quite reasonable to require that the prosecution show that the system was operating within some set of boundary conditions.

I think you're stretching TMN... Encryption, authentication, passwords to prevent stolen money, hacked systems, fraudulant transaction is quite a different realm than claiming Evidence Code violations with regards to photos taken by a camera system, transferred over to a server at Redflex in Arizona and the routed back to the local PD....

In other words, I can describe a number of different scenarios where I would benefit from hacking into Bank Of America's computer, but why in God's name would I hack into Redflex's system?

Now... If you have an issue with Redflex being part of the loop when it comes to RLCs, then that's fine... Lets convince the legislature that there is no room whatsoever for ANY private contractor to do any governmental work.... I wouldn't hold out much hope for that to ever happen!


Let go back to the basics, TMN.... Before RLCs were ever used, and no matter the circumstances, the defense's contention has always been and will continue to be "I crossed the limit line on yellow, but the officer claimed (or lied and said) I crossed on red"...

Well, damn it! If we could only come up with a way to eliminate ANY doubt whatsoever as to the exact moment, -down to the fraction of a second- of when the front bumper went over the limit line, we'd be in great shape...

Well, in come RLCs, and though there is still plenty of room for human error (citation issued under the wrong code section, issued to a driver other than that who is pictured... etc), those errors are easy to catch and have very little to do with anything related to authenticity of the pictures!

If you have an issue with the authenticity of a picture simply because it is taken in one location, then transferred and stored from one server to another server at another location, then I'd suggest you throw away your driver's license simply because that picture it has is not and cannot be authenticated!

I was figuring that I plea my case that the intersection is confusing, poorly identified and there was a safety issue where the cars behind where approaching too quickly and I was worried if I stopped to abruptly I would be rear ended.

None of those are legally based issues that must result in a dismissal. All of those are simple excuses that the court can consider as it decides your case!

I really don't want to give up my trump card in trail by mail about the not accepting the photographic evidence.

If your trump card is valid for a dismissal it should be valid regardless... Though it might make sense that an evidence based argument is not best presented via a TBD, but if that is the case, then why are you doing a TBD, request a court trial and call it a day!

[themadnorwegian]

I think you're stretching TMN... Encryption, authentication, passwords to prevent stolen money, hacked systems, fraudulant transaction is quite a different realm than claiming Evidence Code violations with regards to photos taken by a camera system, transferred over to a server at Redflex in Arizona and the routed back to the local PD....

If you mean stretching for a legal argument, then yes, I agree. I was too opaque in my last post. This is really a place where I think that the law hasn't kept up with the technology.

In other words, I can describe a number of different scenarios where I would benefit from hacking into Bank Of America's computer, but why in God's name would I hack into Redflex's system?

Not all hacking is done for financial gain. Some people break into computer systems just because they're there. In other cases, the point of the intrusion is to install software on the target that then allows the hacker to use the hacked computer to send spam or participate in distributed denial-of-serivce attacks. If the red light camera's computer is connected to the internet, then there are a wide variety of threats that it faces.

Now... If you have an issue with Redflex being part of the loop when it comes to RLCs, then that's fine... Lets convince the legislature that there is no room whatsoever for ANY private contractor to do any governmental work.... I wouldn't hold out much hope for that to ever happen!

I don't hold out much hope for the legislature either. However, I'd like to see something a little different. In the vehicle code for 22350 prosecutions, the legislature explicitly requires that the prosecution prove that a speed trap doesn't exist. As part of that, case law requires the People to present a traffic survey as part of the prosecution's case. Regular maintenance is part of the statute for red-light cameras, but I'd like to see this expanded to cover the computer-security aspects that are ignored. In one of the RLC cases discussed in another thread, the court ruled that it was up to the defense to show that the camera wasn't operating properly. However, given the sophistication of the hardware and software involved, it would be exceptionally difficult for a defendant to ever be able to examine a RLC and determine whether it was operating properly. IMO, this is something that Redflex, or whoever maintains the camera, should be able to prove in court. Otherwise, how can you be sure that the output is correct?

If you have an issue with the authenticity of a picture simply because it is taken in one location, then transferred and stored from one server to another server at another location, then I'd suggest you throw away your driver's license simply because that picture it has is not and cannot be authenticated!

That's not really what I'm objecting to. It's possible to safely move files from one location to another. My concern is with making sure that all of the hardware and software in the camera is working properly, and that the images aren't tampered with on the camera or after they've been downloaded. When RLCs were film based, this would be harder to do because you could always look at the negatives if you believed that the print had been manipulated. When everything is digital, it's a lot easier to tamper with the evidence and have the modification be undetectable.

[zazzn]

If your trump card is valid for a dismissal it should be valid regardless... Though it might make sense that an evidence based argument is not best presented via a TBD, but if that is the case, then why are you doing a TBD, request a court trial and call it a day!

I think you are all going around the encryption problem wrongly. The fact that a US drone was hacked and landed in Iran is proof enough that even the most delicate items are able to be hacked. When arguing the case, I would argue first. Is Redflex a for profit company (Yes) is their company a public traded company (Yes) lets presume that a FOR profit company which only grows by profit would only stand to benefit if the images where modified or tampered with. (motive) Therefore the evidence should not be admitted on the basis of conflict of interest where a for profit company experiences self gain when generating untrue images. (oh and PS I work for an data encryption company and data is compromised ALL the time)

Also I've heard that some Canadian courts do not like or sometimes accept digital photo's since they are tampered with so easily.

In the end I understand why I cannot accept the picture evidence into testimony... Makes sense....

As for the last part of my argument, I figure US is the same like Canada where you are allow to break the law in instances where your safety is in jeopardy, such as a speeding car approaching from the rear and me not stopping abruptly.

as for the TBD, how do you object the evidence? Also is there any examples of a TBD online that I could examine to figure out how exactly I should write and structure this defense? I choose TBD because I can always request an in person date should I lose giving another opportunity to win.

Again thanks for the help guys.

[That Guy]

I think you are all going around the encryption problem wrongly.

Are we?

The fact that a US drone was hacked and landed in Iran is proof enough that even the most delicate items are able to be hacked.

Hold on for a minute let me check one thing.....

....


........


Nope, price of tea in China still unchanged!

And if you really believe that the U.S. drone was somehow hacked and that is why it landed in Iran, I've got some lake front property I know you'd be interested in buying! I will not post the details on a public forum so please, PM me for details!

When arguing the case, I would argue first. Is Redflex a for profit company (Yes) is their company a public traded company (Yes) lets presume that a FOR profit company which only grows by profit would only stand to benefit if the images where modified or tampered with. (motive) Therefore the evidence should not be admitted on the basis of conflict of interest where a for profit company experiences self gain when generating untrue images. (oh and PS I work for an data encryption company and data is compromised ALL the time)

There is nothing illegal or unlawful about hiring a private contractor to perform any aspect of governmental work. Unless you're suggesting that government should only hire non-profit entities to contract with, then your argument has little to no basis! Your discussion should include how you feel about Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, even Boeing should let go of government contracts simply because they are public companies whose fiduciary duty goes to their shareholders first.

There is, by the way, quite the connection between RLCs and one of those three companies I just mentioned! Lockheed Martin, and in addition to them participating in enough government contracts to sustain a profitable existence that has lasted for decades, they also operate a number of RLC systems in a number of cities nationwide. Are you saying that they can be trusted to participate in several top secret government defense contracts but the cannot be trusted to run a RLC system?

Really?

(oh and PS I work for an data encryption company and data is compromised ALL the time)

Of course you would say that... You wouldn't have a job if it didn't!

Although I would guess that you would have a better argument to present that what you offered here if you really worked in such a field!

Also I've heard that some Canadian courts do not like or sometimes accept digital photo's since they are tampered with so easily.

Good or bad for the Canadians,... I can't tell!

In the end I understand why I cannot accept the picture evidence into testimony... Makes sense....

Problem is, you have to convince the judge! Good luck doing that!

Evidence code based arguments are extremely difficult for an average individual to make. That is why on appeal, the list of attorneys for both sides occupies more than half of the first page!

As for the last part of my argument, I figure US is the same like Canada where you are allow to break the law in instances where your safety is in jeopardy, such as a speeding car approaching from the rear and me not stopping abruptly.

But you stopped...



Abruptly...



And a car was approaching from behind...



And nothing happened!



So what's your point???

as for the TBD, how do you object the evidence?

You base your argument(s) on a bunch of hypothetical situations you would expect the officer to present!

But since there are plenty of hypotheticals to consider, the judge might eventually get bored reading arguments that have no merit!

Also is there any examples of a TBD online that I could examine to figure out how exactly I should write and structure this defense?

There are no 2 cases that are exactly alike... So you'll have to be a little more creative than to just copy and paste to make it all fit your particular circumstance!

I choose TBD because I can always request an in person date should I lose giving another opportunity to win.

It sounds to me like your first opportunity is more like a fishing expedition... And by taking two chances, you're doubly reducing your chances at getting traffic school (and a possible fine reduction (if you're judge is willing to circumvent the statutory requirement))!

[themadnorwegian]

Nope, price of tea in China still unchanged!

You'll have to PM me the contact info for your tea merchant. The monkeys who pick my tea have been using scarcity and novelty to drive up the price.

[That Guy]

Not all hacking is done for financial gain. Some people break into computer systems just because they're there.

OK, any evidence or even a hint that any of the systems used in California have been hacked in any manner whatsoever? Not that I know... But I won't claim to know each and every bit of related news!

In other cases, the point of the intrusion is to install software on the target that then allows the hacker to use the hacked computer to send spam or participate in distributed denial-of-serivce attacks.

And anyone who has the knowledge and expertise to accomplish such a hack, and before investing the time and effort into doing so, better realize that potentially, for starters, he is wasting his time attempting this one hack into a police agency's computer system (not too many email addresses to spam there), but even more so, subjecting himself to a possible successful trace by the same Police agency he intended on spamming.

If the red light camera's computer is connected to the internet, then there are a wide variety of threats that it faces.

Well, so far, I have not read of one potential benefit for anyone attempting to do this on a RLC system.

I don't hold out much hope for the legislature either. However, I'd like to see something a little different. In the vehicle code for 22350 prosecutions, the legislature explicitly requires that the prosecution prove that a speed trap doesn't exist. As part of that, case law requires the People to present a traffic survey as part of the prosecution's case. Regular maintenance is part of the statute for red-light cameras, but I'd like to see this expanded to cover the computer-security aspects that are ignored.

You did state that maintenance IS part of the statutory requirement!

And it *IS*!

In fact, maintenance is performed on a weekly basis whereas for a speed trap, the requirement is once every three years for a Radar calibration!

As for computer security, are you suggesting that RLC camera operators have not provisioned their systems to prevent any sort of known security threat?

The question that pops up here is if this were the real issue, then why is it that NO ONE has ever attempted to submit (and later publicize) a CPRA request for information regarding the procedures undertaken by the operator and the law enforcement agency that eventually issues the citation? Just because it is a private entity, does not preclude them from the disclosure requirement simply because their work involved matters that relate to public work. Instead, all everyone is concerned about is the contract that exists between the municipality and the operator!

You might say "well, you back to making that MY responsibility to present such evidence"... My answer is regardless of who's responsibility it is, if a system is susceptible to being easily compromised and you have evidence of instances where it was, would you sit on that evidence and keep it to yourself, or would you climb up on top of the highest building and scream it out?

In an effort to convince the legislature that you're not blowing smoke, present the evidence to them and let them decide how viable it would be to set such requirement and upon whom!

In one of the RLC cases discussed in another thread, the court ruled that it was up to the defense to show that the camera wasn't operating properly.

Well, to use your analogy of a speed trap (or any prosecution for that matter), the court is free to assign a 100% credibility rating to the officer's testimony, and yet, if you as a defendant happen to come across any evidence to suggest otherwise, it is incumbent upon YOU to present that to the court. Affirmative defenses aren't anything new nor are they only related to RLCs... You already know that TMN!

However, given the sophistication of the hardware and software involved, it would be exceptionally difficult for a defendant to ever be able to examine a RLC and determine whether it was operating properly.

Even without sophisticated hardware and software, it is extremely difficult to prove that a speedometer gave out an inaccurate reading... But where is it in this country's constitution or in the state's constitution, in the Penal Code, Vehicle Code or Evidence Code does it guarantee an individual an affirmative defense to each and every criminal act he/she allegedly committed?

Of course there is always that small matter of exculpatory evidence... We can sit here and discuss Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. U.S., exculpatory evidence and the prosecution's duty to disclose it as soon as it becomes known, but even then, if nothing is disclosed, the burden to prove that a due process violation occurred naturally falls upon the defendant, and offering such proof requires a showing of 4 components: (1) Evidentiary component: meaning factual information and not just speculation, (2) Favorableness component: meaning "Evidence" introduction would "favor" the defendant, (3) Materiality component: meaning "Favorable evidence" is also "material", and (4) Disclosure: meaning "Favorable material evidence should have been disclosed... And the point behind all the above is that giving the prosecution the opportunity to DISprove all 4 components (or at least one) chances are, they will. Would you want the opportunity to disprove the charge to rest with the prosecutor? I know I don't!

Speaking of Brady, and in as much as this is an infraction whereby the prosecutor has little if any knowledge of it existing, there are a few arguments out there that say that the responsibility for all Brady disclosures rests with the prosecutor, and NOT the investigating agency. Simple reasoning is that the decision as to what constitutes "exculpatory" evidence and what doesn't, should be lefty up to an attorney to decide! So a LEO is excluded... Sort of kills any Brady discovery argument for any infraction...

Realistically speaking, every traffic control signal is connected to a programmable electronic circuit. Then every traffic control signal has the potential of going through a glitch every now and again. Why is it that none of the evidentiary requirements that you bring up or hope for are brought up when it comes to a non-RLC case? In fact, maintenance (or lack thereof) in such a case is an affirmative defense. So why should it be otherwise for an RLC case?

IMO, this is something that Redflex, or whoever maintains the camera, should be able to prove in court. Otherwise, how can you be sure that the output is correct?

Hey, if its "... good enough for government work..." its good enough fior me! But again, my guess is simply because you have not even made an attempt to shed any reasonable doubt upon its accuracy...

That's not really what I'm objecting to. It's possible to safely move files from one location to another. My concern is with making sure that all of the hardware and software in the camera is working properly, and that the images aren't tampered with on the camera or after they've been downloaded. When RLCs were film based, this would be harder to do because you could always look at the negatives if you believed that the print had been manipulated. When everything is digital, it's a lot easier to tamper with the evidence and have the modification be undetectable.

Actually, that is what you're objecting to, TMN.
I say "you're objecting to the presumption that a picture cannot be authenticated"...
You respond that "I am not objecting to pictures which cannot be authenticated... Instead I am objecting to the introduction of photos that you can not tell with any certainty whether whether they have been tampered with or they are authentic!!!"

You did add the "after they've been downloaded"... Question is downloaded by whom? The operator or the LEA? It doesn't really matter... The following analogy applies to both before and after a download!

So let me approach the answer from a different direction... zazzn started an analogy where he began talking about "motive", "opportunity" and when it got to the third component, it was not identified. That being "means"... And if you know anything about criminal law, you know that those are the elementary components to any criminal charge (or I should say "most" criminal charges)...

Well, there are 2 entities involved here, the RLC system operator and the LEA issuing the citation.

If we assume that the contract between the RLC operator is kosher, then there really is no 'motive" for the RLC operator to fake pictures, they get their pay regardless of whether one citation was presented or 17,285 citations were presented. So you could not prove "motive"!

For the LEA, and although they do reportedly make approximately $4.50 per citation (according to a forum member who is in the know with regards to these matters). If a citation is issued and later contested, then it is also reported that it turns into a losing proposition for the agency. But wait, the simple fact that we are now accusing the LEA of as egregious an act as forging evidence, I think the presumption can be made that we might have BIGGER and MORE SERIOUS ISSUES to be concerned about than RLCs and the authenticity of pictures as evidence!

Would you like to join the municipality as a co-defendant? Sure... However, and while they had plenty of "motive" they had no access to the system and therefore, could not have the "means" or the "opportunity"... Unless you can prove otherwise!

Either way, and even if you can prove that all three elements of such criminal activity, the burden to prove that it did occur, is theoretically upon the ACCUSER. And in this hypothetical, the ACCUSER is YOU! Additionally, since "what is good for the goose, is also good for the gander", neither defendant (the RLC operator or the LEA) in this case is required to prove their innocence; you the accuser carry the burden of proving their guilt!!!

---

You'll have to PM me the contact info for your tea merchant. The monkeys who pick my tea have been using scarcity and novelty to drive up the price.

Hahahaaaa... I laughed so much, it cleared my head cold!!!

I couldn't top that one... Not even a P.E.T.A. joke would come close!

[quirkyquark]

...then why is it that NO ONE has ever attempted to submit (and later publicize) a CPRA request for information regarding the procedures undertaken by the operator and the law enforcement agency that eventually issues the citation? Just because it is a private entity, does not preclude them from the disclosure requirement simply because their work involved matters that relate to public work.

The CPRA only applies to privately sourced documents in as far as they are in the possession of the public agency. It does not apply to Redflex per se, even if those documents relate to public matters.

As to why no one has attempted, you're no stranger to how difficult it is to enforce the CPRA in practice, without resorting to civil litigation. Additionally, no sane defense attorney is going to go fishing for what is most like inculpatory--or at least non-exculpatory--evidence when it is the prosecution's responsibility to provide such evidence.

My answer is regardless of who's responsibility it is, if a system is susceptible to being easily compromised and you have evidence of instances where it was, would you sit on that evidence and keep it to yourself, or would you climb up on top of the highest building and scream it out?

It's easy to philosophize, but the majority of folks who COULD be whistleblowers are usually not. I would guess because they are mostly "insiders" and fear for their job.

Speaking of Brady, and in as much as this is an infraction whereby the prosecutor has little if any knowledge of it existing, there are a few arguments out there that say that the responsibility for all Brady disclosures rests with the prosecutor, and NOT the investigating agency. Simple reasoning is that the decision as to what constitutes "exculpatory" evidence and what doesn't, should be lefty up to an attorney to decide! So a LEO is excluded... Sort of kills any Brady discovery argument for any infraction...

Legally, the prosecutor is only exempted from the obligation to appear in court for infraction proceedings. They may have little or no knowledge in practice, that may be the way things are always done, etc. etc., but it does not absolve them from liability for Brady discovery (or 1054 discovery). Ignorance of the law is not an excuse --- applies to both sides, right? And, as voluminous precedent has established (and we discussed that before), materials in the possession of the investigative agency are in the constructive possession of the prosecution and subject to discovery requirements.

Realistically speaking, every traffic control signal is connected to a programmable electronic circuit. Then every traffic control signal has the potential of going through a glitch every now and again. Why is it that none of the evidentiary requirements that you bring up or hope for are brought up when it comes to a non-RLC case? In fact, maintenance (or lack thereof) in such a case is an affirmative defense. So why should it be otherwise for an RLC case?

An affirmative defense is basically an excuse, or mitigating factors. e.g. I admit I violated the law, but I shouldn't be held liable because.... Evidentiary/foundation requirements are NOT affirmative defenses.

As for non-RLC case, none of it matters because presumably the officer will testify on the stand that he/she saw the signal being violated by the defendant.

Hey, if its "... good enough for government work..." its good enough fior me!

Well, your citing officer's radar, as well as the officer himself, was definitely "good enough for government work", and your survey is not 5+ years old. Are you going to be satisfied only with the survey and NOT requesting calibration/maintenance/training in discovery?

I say "you're objecting to the presumption that a picture cannot be authenticated"...
You respond that "I am not objecting to pictures which cannot be authenticated... Instead I am objecting to the introduction of photos that you can not tell with any certainty whether whether they have been tampered with or they are authentic!!!"

As I explained in the Goldsmith thread, authentication can (should) only be done by a person who has sufficient personal knowledge to allay these concerns, OR via the introduction of sufficient documentary evidence thereof (via the appropriate hearsay exception).

[themadnorwegian]

OK, any evidence or even a hint that any of the systems used in California have been hacked in any manner whatsoever? Not that I know... But I won't claim to know each and every bit of related news!

How would we ever hear about this? California's data protection laws require companies to disclose data breaches to customers if personally identifying information is stolen. Does Redflex have access to the DMV information? My understanding was that it's the police departments that actually determine who the driver is once they see the pictures. So, if a Redflex camera were hacked, and Redflex was able to determine that unauthorized access had occurred, they're under no obligations to tell anyone about the problem. Last month, it was reported that Nortel let hackers roam their networks for 10 years. In case you're not familiar, Nortel is a now defunct manufacturer of switches used by many of the world's largest phone companies.

And anyone who has the knowledge and expertise to accomplish such a hack, and before investing the time and effort into doing so, better realize that potentially, for starters, he is wasting his time attempting this one hack into a police agency's computer system (not too many email addresses to spam there), but even more so, subjecting himself to a possible successful trace by the same Police agency he intended on spamming.

I agree, but many of the people who know how to do this are very careful about covering their tracks. Others live in countries where hacking isn't illegal, or they simply don't fear extradition to the US. Somebody has to detect the intrusion in order for an investigation to occur.

As for computer security, are you suggesting that RLC camera operators have not provisioned their systems to prevent any sort of known security threat?

That's my point. We don't know what steps Redflex takes in order to keep their cameras secure. There is a process called software assurance, which attempts to document how software is designed to work, what security threats it can resist, and whether the software actually conforms to the design that's described. For highly-sensitive applications the Federal government requires computer systems that have been certified through the common criteria, and posses an evaluation assurance level. Sometimes the certifications end up telling us the obvious, but having the documentation present at least helps us understand what kind of threats a system can survive, and whether the deployment scenario is realistic.

In the case of a red light camera, the Controlled Access Protection Profile would be insufficient because the camera is in public, and connected to public networks, where it can be tampered with by virtually anyone. The CAPP assumes a "non-hostile and well-managed user community requiring protection against threats of inadvertent or casual attempts to breach the system security."

I did a search with NIAP, who maintains a list of Common Criteria Certified products, but I didn't see Redflex on the list.

The question that pops up here is if this were the real issue, then why is it that NO ONE has ever attempted to submit (and later publicize) a CPRA request for information regarding the procedures undertaken by the operator and the law enforcement agency that eventually issues the citation? Just because it is a private entity, does not preclude them from the disclosure requirement simply because their work involved matters that relate to public work. Instead, all everyone is concerned about is the contract that exists between the municipality and the operator!

It's a great question. I'm assuming that Redflex has no common criteria certification, because it's not on public lists, and it can't be found from their website. Most companies who go through the trouble of doing this advertise their certification. This is a checkbox for government accounts, but it also gets them sales elsewhere. I'm assuming that the reason there have been no CPRA requests is because we're talking about something that could be Redflex's intellectual property. For-profit companies are very reluctant to disclose highly-confidential source code to third parties. Some European governments have been adopting purchasing rules requiring open-source products, which would get around some of these issues.

You might say "well, you back to making that MY responsibility to present such evidence"... My answer is regardless of who's responsibility it is, if a system is susceptible to being easily compromised and you have evidence of instances where it was, would you sit on that evidence and keep it to yourself, or would you climb up on top of the highest building and scream it out?

I guess I don't understand why Redflex would ever want to disclose that their product might be susceptible to being hacked.

Of course there is always that small matter of exculpatory evidence... We can sit here and discuss Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. U.S., exculpatory evidence and the prosecution's duty to disclose it as soon as it becomes known, but even then, if nothing is disclosed, the burden to prove that a due process violation occurred naturally falls upon the defendant, and offering such proof requires a showing of 4 components: (1) Evidentiary component: meaning factual information and not just speculation, (2) Favorableness component: meaning "Evidence" introduction would "favor" the defendant, (3) Materiality component: meaning "Favorable evidence" is also "material", and (4) Disclosure: meaning "Favorable material evidence should have been disclosed... And the point behind all the above is that giving the prosecution the opportunity to DISprove all 4 components (or at least one) chances are, they will. Would you want the opportunity to disprove the charge to rest with the prosecutor? I know I don't!

Perhaps I wrote this poorly, but I'm trying to suggest that the prosecution should have to present documentation that shows that the system is working properly, and that describes the different steps that are taken to mitigate security threats. I'm not saying that the prosecutor must disprove the charge, but just as with 40802, they should as part of their prima facie case, produce documentation that describes the security on the system, any logs that would be relevant to intrusion detection, and other material that would allow a fact finder to ascertain whether one could trust the integrity of the system. It would still be up to the defense to look at the documents and make a counterargument. The problem now is that no such documentation is available, nor is there any way to get it.

Hey, if its "... good enough for government work..." its good enough fior me! But again, my guess is simply because you have not even made an attempt to shed any reasonable doubt upon its accuracy...

Not sure how to respond, but if you're saying that you trust the manufacturer then what could I possibly do to convince you that these systems are often more vulnerable than they appear?

Actually, that is what you're objecting to, TMN.
I say "you're objecting to the presumption that a picture cannot be authenticated"...
You respond that "I am not objecting to pictures which cannot be authenticated... Instead I am objecting to the introduction of photos that you can not tell with any certainty whether whether they have been tampered with or they are authentic!!!"

Too many double negatives. Yes, you're right that I'm concerned about whether it's possible to authenticate pictures from red-light cameras. I'm not trying to say that it's technologically impossible to ever do this. Rather, that until companies are more transparent about how these systems are built, maintained, operated, and secured, it's currently impossible for us to say with any certainty whether or not the output has been tampered with. In that sense, I don't agree with way that Evidence Code 1553 is written. I realize that this makes the whole argument entirely theoretical.

Ultimately, it should be possible to have a picture taken from one of these cameras, and then have the picture transmitted to the police and courts in such a way that we're sure that the image was not modified after it was saved to the camera's internal storage. However, I don't think those procedures are in place today. In many ways, this is similar to what has to happen to get e-voting to work properly. You have to make sure that the ballots, or pictures, were true at the time they were collected, and have not been modified by anyone since they were collected.

For the LEA, and although they do reportedly make approximately $4.50 per citation (according to a forum member who is in the know with regards to these matters). If a citation is issued and later contested, then it is also reported that it turns into a losing proposition for the agency. But wait, the simple fact that we are now accusing the LEA of as egregious an act as forging evidence, I think the presumption can be made that we might have BIGGER and MORE SERIOUS ISSUES to be concerned about than RLCs and the authenticity of pictures as evidence!

It doesn't have to be intentional, and I'm not accusing a LEA of fraud. A computer virus, failing hard-drive, cosmic rays, broken memory, contamination at the FAB that made your ecache, bad cabling, and many other problems can lead to data corruption. A LEA could have inadvertent data corruption and not notice it for months. It should be possible to immediately find the problem and obtain a new picture.

[zazzn]

Are we?
And if you really believe that the U.S. drone was somehow hacked and that is why it landed in Iran, I've got some lake front property I know you'd be interested in buying! I will not post the details on a public forum so please, PM me for details!

From what I understand the GPS was spoofed, by sending stronger signals from ground based stations and a host of other electronic warfare.

I also said there was nothign illegal about the Redflex company. I was just saying it's a NON US company with a FOR profit motivation therefor there should be reasonable doubt that unless there are maintenance records along with authenticity reports the images should not be allowable as evidence.

This is all besides the point, you are telling me that if I'm going to fight the ticket, that I should fight it based on the 3 cases that you posted earlier, however, you are now saying that it's going to be very very hard for me to convince the judge to not admit the pictures in to evidence.

As for stopping yes, I did, but that would explain the delay in the stop, meaning why I crossed the line. I didn't slowed gradually instead of abruptly by locking up and not crossing the line. I'm saying if I didn't do that there could have been an accident. Don't get me wrong it's very weak, but I'm trying to find a leg to stand on here.

I know no 2 cases are alike, but I'm trying to find a well put together case that I can use as my base so I have the right lingo, and format. If you can point me in that direction I'd be very appreciative.

I could care less about traffic school... I want to win, or lose. Fair and square....

Basically, as I've said in the first post, the signage is very confusing, I was tripped up by the lights and the placement of the lights which made me react later then I should have. Every time I go to that intersection I still get tripped up and it's misleading and I do not feel that I should be responsible for this because of irresponsibility of the intersection planners of presenting information overload at this intersection.

To add fuel to the fire, I just found out it's actually not Redflex it's ACS in San Francisco which is a child of Xerox. I found some data sheets on the cameras
http://www.acs-inc.com/transportatio...ight_rlcs.aspx

It claims it uses FTP to upload the images, which would mean that's an insecure protocol, which means it could be tampered at some point. "Web based control" how is that secured... ect.

yada yada list goes on.

[zazzn]

Hi Fella's

This is my first letter, I was hoping that you could tell how you feel about this and should I make any changes.

I try not to admit any guilt here, and explain the actions of what transpired, leaving it open for me to dispute the evidence should we end up in actual court in stead of trial by mail.



STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defentant: xxx xxxx
Citation: xxxxxx
Please accept this declaration regarding CVC40902. I plead not guilty to the charge of violating CVC 21453C.

Below a Statement of facts:
While Driving West Bound on Fell St at approx 21:50 hrs on 2/1/12 several photograph was taken of a dark Lexus Sadan approaching the intersection of Fell st and Masonic ave in moderate traffic. Upon reviewing the photographic evidence solid green traffic signals are illuminated. Upon further investigation the intersection has no less than 7 signals 5 of which will be illuminated green at any given time. (2 Solid green, 1 Green arrow, 2 bicycle signals and 2 left turn arrows)
When approaching the intersection several signals are obscured or blocked signage and natural foliage of neighbouring trees. In this case, both left turn signal arrows are blocked at several points. Furthermore, the proximity of the bicycle signals to the left turn signals creates an unsafe situation due to misinformation produced by similarly placed and looking signals.
Reviewing the video evidence you will notice the Lexus break lights are illuminated when passing the camera as the vehicle slows however, for a short period the brake lights shut off and shortly after illuminate again.
There is no doubt that the misinformation provided by the poorly placed signage and traffic signals create a situation where it would have been unsafe for the Lexus to stop abruptly due to the proximity and speed of following traffic which backs up in several lanes due as depicted in the video evidence.
Furthermore the information on SFMTA clearly indicates on FAQ question #5
Q. My picture was taken, but I stopped. Will I get a ticket?
A. We take pictures of drivers BEFORE they are in the intersection and once they are in the intersection after the signal has turned red. Pictures are taken to show the car behind the stop line after the light has turned red and to show that the car continued through the intersection during the red. If the driver stops before going through the intersection, that will be apparent in the 2nd photo and a ticket will not be issued.
http://www.sfmta.com/cms/venf/14440.html
Yet clearly this ticket must have been issued in error.
I believe that I did not violate CVC 21453C due to the reasons listed above. I respectfully request this case be dismissed.